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A vertically integrated ﬁrm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market. There is a
potential entrant in the downstream market. Both ﬁrms use the same essential input. The regulator’s
objectives are (i) to ensure ﬁnancing of the essential input and (ii) to generate competition in the
downstream market. The regulatory mechanism grants non-discriminatory access of the essential facility
to the entrant provided it pays a two-part tariff to the incumbent. The optimal mechanism generates
inefﬁcient entry. The inefﬁcient entry captures the trade-off between market efﬁciency and infrastructure
ﬁnancing resulting from incomplete information and non-discriminatory access.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we are interested in the consequences of market liberalization in a regulated
network-based industry. A common feature of such an industry is that the regulated
incumbent ﬁrm owns an ‘‘essential facility’’, that is a facility that cannot be cheaply
duplicated (e.g. long-distance electricity transmission grids, rail-tracks and stations, local
wire line telecommunications, water supply networks). By ‘market liberalization’ we
mean that a competitor can access the essential facility of the regulated incumbent if it
chooses to do so.
It is well known that in the absence of market liberalization the regulator designs a
welfare-maximizing contract for the (monopolist) incumbent. Under known (unknown)
marginal cost of the incumbent, the welfare-maximizing contract speciﬁes marginal cost
pricing (‘virtual’ marginal cost pricing) and full reimbursement (type-contingent partial
reimbursement) of the ﬁxed cost of the essential facility with public funds (see Baron and
Myerson 1982).
When there is a monopoly bottleneck in the production chain arising from the
presence of the essential facility, competition and regulation are complements rather than
substitutes (see World Bank 2002, Chapter 8).1 In these markets, allowing access of the
incumbent’s essential facility (that is, the bottleneck input) to competitors can help (a) in
achieving welfare-enhancing competition for the ﬁnal output and (b) in ﬁnancing the cost
of maintenance of the essential facility. In this paper we provide a theoretical model to
address this problem of regulating a market with essential facility by allowing for
endogenous market structure on the downstream market and assuming incomplete
information.
In the theory of access pricing proposed by Laffont and Tirole (1994), the market
structure is assumed to be exogenous and the access charges aim at maximizing the total
consumer surplus, taking the number and the type of competitors as given. In our main
problem, the regulator speciﬁes the access charges without knowing the entrant’s cost
conditions and then the entry decision is taken. Hence the market structure is
endogenous, and depends on both the regulatory environment and the entrant’s cost
conditions. Auriol and Laffont (1993) consider the problem of ﬁrms with unknown cost
competing ex ante for a market. In their problem the market structure, ex post, is part of
the regulatory mechanism and the regulator can allow the ﬁrms to operate as a duopoly
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in order to reduce information rent. Hence the mechanism in Auriol and Laffont (1993)
completely regulates the market. A similar problem was analysed by Dana and Spier
(1994), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2004) and Mougeot and Naegelen (2005). We depart from
these frameworks and analyse the situation in which it is not possible for the regulator to
regulate the activities of the potential entrant. Hence the main features of the endogenous
market structure of our problem are (a) the absence of ex ante competition for the
market, (b) the presence of ex post competition on the market and (c) endogenous entry
decisions.
In our problem we assume that the regulator cannot extract the entrant’s cost
information and hence allows the entrant to use the essential facility on an open
access basis, provided the entrant pays the incumbent some speciﬁed price for its use.
‘Open access’ means that any competitor that meets some pre-speciﬁed requirements
(e.g. technical, safety or ﬁnancial ﬁtness requirements) can have access to the essential
input on a non-discriminatory basis. For example, in the European Union, railway
undertakings need to apply for a licence and a safety certiﬁcate delivered by the
member states to provide rail services. Granting a non-discriminatory access to the
essential input is quite common in practice.2 It is also quite common to have an
asymmetric regulatory regime between the incumbent and the entrant(s). The entrants
are often free to pick and choose the market in which to operate and the consumers they
want to serve while the incumbent is forced to serve all consumers (e.g. universal service
obligations).
Our problem integrates these two features: open and non-discriminatory access to the
essential input, and different regulatory regimes for the incumbent and the entrant. We
call this sort of regulation an ‘indirect’ one because the regulator does not regulate the
entrant but simply allows open access of the essential facility provided the entrant pays a
two-part tariff to the incumbent. This two-part tariff is contingent only on the known
marginal cost (or known distribution of the marginal cost) of the incumbent. We use a
two-part tariff for pricing access to the network because in our framework the potential
entrant has market power. The variable part of the tariff is used to countervail the
entrant’s market power and the ﬁxed part is used to collect revenue for ﬁnancing the
network’s costs. The access charge paid by the entrant helps the regulator to reduce (at
least partially) the burden of recovering the cost of the essential input.
We also address the question of the efﬁciency of entry. At this point one needs to
distinguish between efﬁcient entry and efﬁcient market structure. Entry is said to be
efﬁcient (in our type of market liberalization framework) if the competitor can, by
entering the market, increase the welfare over that obtaining in the regulated monopoly
situation. It is obvious that welfare can increase with entry only if the entrant’s marginal
cost is below that of the incumbent. Thus, when the market is open to a rival ﬁrm,
efﬁcient entry means that the entrant enters the market if and only if it has a lower
marginal cost than the incumbent. An efﬁcient market structure is more of an efﬁcient
market design issue. It corresponds to the ﬁrst-best situation where the regulator gives
monopoly rights to the ﬁrm with the lower marginal cost. Under the ﬁrst-best analysis it
is implicit that the regulator knows the marginal costs of the incumbent and the entrant,
the regulator dictates the production level of the two ﬁrms, and the regulator has the
ability to shut down a ﬁrm, speciﬁcally the one, with higher marginal cost. The papers of
Auriol and Laffont (1993) and Dana and Spier (1994) focus on such a market design
problem. Our framework deals with an open-access setup with no direct regulation of the
entrant. In our setting entry is typically inefﬁcient; that is, either a cost-efﬁcient entrant
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stays out of the market, or a cost-inefﬁcient entrant enters the market (see Baumol et al.
1982 and Armstrong 2001).
Our indirect regulatory mechanism prescribes (i) above-marginal-cost pricing if entry
does not occur and below-marginal-cost pricing if entry takes place, (ii) a positive lump-
sum entry fee to be paid by the entrant to the incumbent, (iii) a per-unit subsidy to be paid
by the incumbent to the entrant, (iv) a public subsidy to (partially) ﬁnance the
infrastructure cost, (v) a reduced share of public transfer for infrastructure ﬁnancing
relative to the case of a regulated monopolist, and (vi) no cross-subsidization of the
incumbent’s network costs by the incumbent’s proﬁt on the downstream market. Under
this indirect regulatory regime, it is possible that a potential entrant, more cost-efﬁcient
than the regulated incumbent, stays out of the market.
We also consider the problem of indirect regulation when the cost of the incumbent
and entrant are unknown. In this context, the regulatory mechanism provides an
information rent to the more efﬁcient incumbent ﬁrm. Given that these rents are socially
costly, the regulator partially substitutes the incumbent’s production by the entrant’s
production. Hence there is more entry. Moreover, inefﬁcient entry can occur in both
directions; that is, it is possible that an entrant less efﬁcient than the incumbent enters the
downstream market, and it is also possible that an entrant more efﬁcient than the incumbent
stays out of the market.
The paper is organized in the following way. We conclude this section by comparing
our results with some of the existing literature. In Section I we introduce our model, in
Section II we provide our main results, and we conclude our analysis in Section III. All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Related literature
One can compare the results of our paper with other papers dealing with the problem of
regulation with an endogenous market structure. Caillaud and Tirole (2004) consider the
problem of infrastructure ﬁnancing under asymmetric information. As in our problem,
an open access policy raises welfare in their paper, but since competition reduces proﬁt
the project can become non-viable if one allows open access. However, in their model a
monopoly franchise on the downstream market is granted to the incumbent in situations
where competition may have a high future proﬁtability. This pattern results from the
common value environment. Both social welfare and proﬁt increases with market
proﬁtability, and hence extraction of incumbent’s private information is impossible
without the granting of a monopoly franchise. The regulator and the incumbent ﬁrm are
in a situation of non-responsiveness where efﬁciency and incentives conﬂict (see
Guesnerie and Laffont 1984).
Caillaud (1990) considers the problem of regulating an incumbent ﬁrm facing
entry possibility on the downstream market. As in our own setting, unregulated
competitors can enter the downstream market after the regulator has speciﬁed the
regulatory mechanism; but competitors bypass the essential input of the incumbent and
supply the service on the downstream market using an alternate technology. The
regulator then has fewer instruments with which to inﬂuence the entry decision and
cannot credibly deter entry by setting large access fees. In Caillaud’s framework there is a
competitive fringe of entrants on the market, and the regulator shuts down the
incumbent if the competitors are expected to be more efﬁcient than the incumbent. This
is not possible in our framework, since shut down implies that the market is left to an
unregulated monopolist.
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Finally, Lewis and Sappington (1999) and De Fraja (1999) study, as we do, an access
pricing problem in the context of asymmetric information. Lewis and Sappington assume
that the regulator does not know the entrant’s cost and that entry always takes place. So
in their paper the market structure is given. De Fraja (1999) assumes that the entrant’s
cost is known and that the incumbent’s cost is unknown. In his framework inefﬁcient
entry is observed: it is optimal to let a less efﬁcient competitor operate on the
downstream market because, owing to the unknown cost of the incumbent, it is always
better partially to substitute the incumbent’s output with that of the entrant.
I. THE MODEL
A regulated incumbent ﬁrm provides services to the ﬁnal consumers. To provide these
services, the incumbent uses its essential facility (network) as input. There is a potential
entrant on the downstream market. To operate on the downstream market, both the
incumbent and the entrant use the same essential input. The entrant can use the
incumbent’s essential input provided it pays the incumbent an appropriate access charge.
The incumbent also receives public subsidies from the regulator to ﬁnance the network.
The regulator (or public authority) speciﬁes the amount of services that the incumbent
should supply to the consumers. The regulator also speciﬁes the amount of access charge
that the incumbent should receive from the entrant if it decides to enter the downstream
market. The access charge in our problem is a two-part tariff. The regulatory mechanism
is observable, and hence the entry decision of the potential entrant depends on the
quantity to be produced by the incumbent and the two-part tariff that the entrant has to
pay to the incumbent if it decides to enter the downstream market. Figure 1 depicts the
timing of the events.
The downstream market demand function is PðQÞ ¼ a bQ; where a40, b40, Q is
the quantity demanded and P(Q) is the market-clearing price corresponding to Q. The
vertically integrated incumbent uses its essential facility and provides services to the ﬁnal
consumers. The (known) ﬁxed cost of the infrastructure is c40. For simplicity, we
assume that there is no cost of using the infrastructure. The incumbent can supply
services at a constant marginal cost y[ ½y; y: The total cost of the integrated ﬁrm (or
incumbent), when it supplies qi units, is C qi; yð Þ ¼ yqi þ c: We will consider the
possibility of both known and unknown cost. When the cost is unknown, we need the
following assumptions for our analysis.
1. The marginal cost has a continuous density f(  ) and f(y)40 for all y[ y; y :
2. The distribution satisﬁes the hazard rate condition: LðyÞ ¼ FðyÞ=f ðyÞ is increasing in
y. Here FðyÞ ¼ R x¼y
x¼y f ðxÞdx is the distribution function.
The potential entrant can produce an amount qe at a marginal cost of f[ y; y
 
:
Throughout the paper, we assume that the marginal cost of the entrant is unknown
and that it has a continuous distribution function G(f) and a density function g(f) where
g(f)40 for all f[ y; y
 









on the downstream market
FIGURE 1. The timing of the events.
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assume that the marginal cost of the entrant follows a uniform distribution; that is,
gðfÞ ¼ 1=D for all f[ y; y  where D  y y: We also assume that the marginal cost of
the entrant is independent of the marginal cost of the incumbent. When correlation
between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s cost is positive, the regulatory problem is in
general non-concave, hence intractable (see Caillaud 1990). With independence, the
problem may be non-concave too, but a solution is possible. If the potential entrant
decides to enter the market, it has to pay a two-part access charge: a ﬁxed fee A and a
per-unit fee a. The amounts of A and a are speciﬁed by the regulator.
The regulator maximizes a weighted sum of consumer and producer surplus net
of transfer: W ¼ SðQÞ  PðQÞQþ b pi þ pef g  t, where, SðQÞ ¼
RQ
0 PðxÞdx; pi is the
proﬁt of the incumbent, pe is the proﬁt of the entrant, t is the amount of transfer paid by
the regulator to the incumbent and b[ ½0; 1 is the welfare weight attached to the
producers’ surplus. In this context, the transfer t is meant to ﬁnance part of the essential
input cost. We assume that there exists a non-distortionary tax system and hence the
shadow cost of public funding is equal to zero. Adding a non-zero shadow cost of public
funding adds nothing substantial to the analysis but more distortions. The results with
non-zero shadow cost are qualitatively similar to what we get in this paper without
having such a cost. Hence the regulator has four instruments at her disposal: the quantity
of the incumbent qi, the transfer t, the ﬁxed fee A and the per-unit fee a.
There are two stages to our problem. In the ﬁrst stage the regulator offers a
regulatory mechanism to the incumbent. The regulatory mechanism Mir ¼ hqi(  ), A(  )
a(  ), t(  )i speciﬁes a quantity-ﬁxed access chargeFper-unit access chargeFtransfer
quadruple that depends on the marginal cost of the incumbent. In particular,
qi : y; y
 ! Rþ, A : y; y ! R; a : y; y ! R and t : y; y ! R:3 We restrict attention
to continuous mechanisms only. Given the regulatory mechanism, in stage 2, the
potential entrant takes its entry decision. The entrant observes the regulatory mechanism
before making its entry and quantity decisions (Stackelberg follower). The price is then
set to equate demand and supply. The Stackelberg structure of the quantity game reﬂects
the dominant position of the incumbent in the downstream market. We call this an
indirect regulation mechanism.
Before going into the regulator’s ﬁrst-stage problem of designing the indirect
regulatory mechanism, we conclude this section with two subsections. In the ﬁrst we
analyse the optimal second-stage entry decision of the entrant. In the second subsection
we discuss the ﬁrst-best mechanism where the marginal costs of the incumbent and the
entrant are common knowledge and where it is possible to completely regulate both the
incumbent and the entrant.
Entrant’s entry decision
In our model the entry decision is taken after the regulator has designed the regulatory
mechanism. Therefore, even though the entrant is not directly regulated, the regulatory
mechanism (except the transfer received by the incumbent) affects the entry decision and
the quantity supplied by the entrant. The entrant’s maximization problem in stage 2 is to
select qeðy;fÞ ¼ maxqe Pðqe þ qiðyÞÞ  aðyÞ  fgqe  AðyÞf g: Assuming that entry takes
place, the solution to this problem is
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The proﬁt of an entrant active in the downstream market is




It is now obvious from (2) that the potential entrant enters the downstream market if
f[ ½y;KðyÞÞ where KðyÞ ¼ PðqiðyÞÞ  aðyÞ  2yðyÞ and yðyÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bAðyÞp : Moreover, the
proﬁt of the entrant, with marginal cost f[ ½y; y, is
peðy;fÞ ¼ 0 if f*KðyÞPðQðy;fÞÞ  aðyÞ  ff gqeðy;fÞ  AðyÞ if f<KðyÞ

;
where Qðy;fÞ ¼ qiðyÞ þ qeðy;fÞ: Given the second-stage optimization of the entrant, the
ex post proﬁt of the incumbent with marginal cost y[ ½y; y, is




Consider the ﬁrst-best situation with known y and f. Given the welfare function W ¼
SðQÞ  PðQÞQþ bfpi þ peg  t; the ﬁrst-best solution is
FB (1). If y4f then qi ¼ a y=b, A ¼ a ¼ 0, t ¼ c and hence qe ¼ 0.
FB (2). If y4f then qi ¼ 0, a ¼  bqe, A ¼ bq2e , t ¼ c and qe ¼ a y=b:
The efﬁcient market structure corresponds to a situation where either the entrant or
the incumbent acts as a monopolist. The operating ﬁrm is the one with lower marginal
cost. The problem with such a ﬁrst-best mechanism lies in its implementability arising
from the open-access nature of our framework. As can be seen, to achieve the ﬁrst-bests
the access charge should be contingent on the cost f, contradicting our assumption that
the mechanism must be non-discriminatory. In Armstrong (2001), the regulator achieves
the ﬁrst-best solution in an open-access environment with an ECPR access charge.
However, the ﬁrms compete a` la Bertrand and the market is entirely served by the ﬁrm
with lower marginal cost; therefore there is no point in regulating the supply of the ﬁrms,
and the only reason for access charge is to ensure an efﬁcient market structureFwhich
the ECPR achieves.4 In our model, ﬁrms compete in quantities. So being more cost-
effective is not enough to exclude the rival from the market. Thus, the likely market
structures in our case are (i) a duopoly or (ii) a monopoly incumbent.
II. INDIRECT REGULATION
We now consider the mechanism design problem of the regulator when the entrant’s cost
is not known. Consider any mechanism Mir(  ). Given that the marginal cost of the
potential entrant is unknown and that the incumbent’s marginal cost is known, the
expected proﬁt of the incumbent in stage one is PiðyÞ ¼
R f¼y
f¼y piðy;fÞgðfÞdf:




mðy;fÞgðfÞdfþ f1 GðKðyÞÞgPðqiðyÞÞqiðyÞ  c yqiðyÞ þ tðyÞ;
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where mðy;fÞ ¼ PðQðy;fÞÞqiðyÞ þ aðyÞqeðy;fÞ þ AðyÞ: Given any y[ ½y; y, the regula-




½SðQðy;fÞÞ  PðQðy;fÞÞQðy;fÞ þ bfpiðy;fÞ þ peðy;fÞg
 tðyÞgðfÞdf;
subject to the participation constraint of the incumbent (i.e. subject to Pi(y)X 0). By
assuming that the entrant’s marginal cost follows uniform distribution, we obtain the
optimal mechanism of the regulator. This optimization problem is non-concave for a
certain range of b. In such a situation a characterization of the solution is possible by
bunching types appropriately. The reason for non-concavity is that the expected surplus
is a cubical equation in quantity of the incumbent.5
To make the exposition of our ﬁrst proposition transparent, we introduce the
following function. We deﬁne
HbðyÞ ¼ yþ 11 6b
56 32b
 




ð11 6bÞ2D2  2ð56 32bÞDðy yÞ
q
and Qðy; bÞ ¼ 1 if Db(y)X 0 and Qðy; bÞ ¼ 0 if Db(y) is not a real number. One can show
that HbðyÞ is a real valued function which is non-decreasing and convex in y[ ½y; y:
Moreover, HbðyÞ ¼ y and HbðyÞ>y for all y[ ½y; y: The dummy function Qðy; bÞ takes
care of the non-concavity of the regulators’ optimization problem by allowing for
bunching whenever Db(y) is not a real number.
Proposition 1. Given any bA[0,1], the optimal indirect regulatory mechanism MfirðyÞ ¼
hqfi ðyÞ;Af ðyÞ; af ðyÞ; tf ðyÞi speciﬁes that, 8 y[ ½y; y,
1. q
f
i ðyÞ ¼ a HbðyÞ=b,
2. Af ðyÞ ¼ r1ðbÞS2bðyÞ=b,
3. af ðyÞ ¼ r2ðbÞSbðyÞ and
4. tf ðyÞ ¼ c ½4ð1þ br2ðbÞÞS3bðyÞ=bD;
where r1(b) ¼ 6 4b, r2(b) ¼ 5 2b and SbðyÞ ¼ ð HbðyÞ  yÞ=ðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ:
With indirect regulation, the market price is above the incumbent’s marginal cost if
entry does not occur; that is, Pðqfi ðyÞÞ ¼ HbðyÞ>y for all y[ ½y; y: This means that the
incumbent produces less compared with the regulated monopoly regime. However, if
entry takes place the market price falls below the incumbent’s marginal cost.
Interestingly, given any bA[0,1], the expected price is such that the incumbent realizes
a zero expected proﬁt from its downstream operations; i.e. EfðPðQðy;fÞÞ ¼ y for all
y such that Qðy; bÞ ¼ 1. Even though the expected price is identical to the price under
the direct regulation monopoly outcome, under indirect regulation competition
increases welfare because the ﬁnancial contribution of the regulator is lower
tf ðyÞ<c ¼ tf ðyÞ for all y[ðy; y :
If the potential entrant decides to enter, then the entrant has to pay a lump-sum
access charge to the incumbent and the entrant receives a per-unit subsidy from the
incumbent. The reason for per-unit subsidy is to reduce the market power of the entrant.
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If there is no per-unit subsidy, then the entrant would have supplied an output less than
the competitive output (since Stackelberg-follower output is lower than the competitive
output). By setting af(y)o0 for all y[ðy; y, the regulator artiﬁcially reduces the entrant’s
marginal cost and thereby partially offsets the negative effect of the entrant’s market
power. This result is standard in the access pricing literature (see Laffont and Tirole 2000,
Chapter 3).6
In our problem, even though the subsidy reduces the market power of the entrant,
there is a positive net transfer from the entrant to the incumbent; i.e.








for all y[ðy; y:
The ﬁxed part of the access charge aims partially to ﬁnance the infrastructure and to
deter entry of high marginal cost potential entrants. Entry needs to be restricted
optimally because the price is above marginal cost under the optimal mechanism if the
incumbent remains a monopolist. This price markup attracts inefﬁcient entrants in the
downstream market. To exclude these inefﬁcient entrants, the regulator ﬁxes a high Af(y).
When will entry take place? The next proposition provides a complete answer to this
question.
Proposition 2. The mechanism M
f
irðyÞ ¼ hqfi ðyÞ;Af ðyÞ; af ðyÞ; tf ðyÞi leads to inefﬁcient
entry. Entry takes place for all f[ y;Kf ðyÞ  where y<Kf ðyÞ<y; 8y[ðy; y and Kf ðyÞ ¼ y:
To preserve ﬁnancing of the essential facility, the regulator bans those entrants with
marginal cost fA(Kf(y),y]. These are the entrants whose cost efﬁciency (relative to that of
the incumbent) is not ‘substantial’. By limiting entry, the regulator raises the incumbent’s
revenue. However, all types of incumbent ﬁrms, except the most efﬁcient one face a
positive probability of entry since y<Kf ðyÞ, 8y[ðy; y: When the infrastructure cost is
partially ﬁnanced by public transfers, it is always efﬁcient to allow for the entry of a more
efﬁcient competitor, provided that the efﬁciency advantage of the competitor is
sufﬁciently large.7 This part of the result is in sharp contrast to the result in Caillaud
and Tirole (2004), where the regulator bans entry of competitors on market with high
future proﬁtability. In De Fraja (1999), where the regulator knows f but not y, another
form of inefﬁcient entry is observed: that is Kf(y)4y, and an entrant less efﬁcient than the
incumbent could be active on the downstream market. In the following subsection we
verify that our conclusion of inefﬁcient entry is a robust one.
A general result
What happens to the mechanismM
f
irðÞ if we relax the assumption that the unknown cost
of the entrant follows a uniform distribution? Given our assumption that the mechanism
is continuous, that g(f)40 for all f[ ½y; y and that G(f) is continuous, two important
observations can be made.
1. In any continuous mechanism, EfðPðQðy;fÞÞÞ ¼ y for all y[ ½y; y in the non-
bunching zone (see condition (iv) in the proof of Proposition 1). This implies that,
given any bA[0,1], we will continue to have Pðqf ðyÞÞ>y for all y such that Qðy; bÞ ¼ 1.
Unless the incumbent is the most efﬁcient type, there is a positive probability of entry.
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2. Inefﬁcient entry will always take place. The next proposition explains this
observation.
Proposition 3. For any g(f) with the property that g(f)40 for all y[ ½y; y and G(f) is
continuous, we cannot have an optimal continuous mechanism M
f
ir for which entry is
efﬁcient.
Unknown cost of the incumbent
In this sub-section we assume that marginal cost of the incumbent is private information
and that its density function satisﬁes assumptions (1) and (2). Hence the regulator is
unaware of the marginal cost of both the incumbent and the entrant. Therefore, we have
an indirect regulation problem under incomplete information. The objective of the
regulator now is to select Msir ¼ hqsi ðyÞ;AsðyÞ; asðyÞ; tsðyÞi that maximizes
Ey EfðWðy;fÞÞ
  ¼ R y¼yy¼y EfðWðy;fÞÞf ðyÞdy subject to (i) the participation constraint
Pi(y)X 0, 8 y [ ½y; y and (ii) the incentive compatible constraint: PiðyÞ*Piðy; y0Þ,
8 ðy; y0Þ[ ½y; y2; where Piðy; y0Þ ¼ Piðy0Þ  ðy y0Þqiðy0Þ: The optimal mechanism Msir
satisﬁes constraints (i) and (ii) if and only if 8 y [ ½y; y, the optimal quantity qi(y) is non-
increasing in y, and PiðyÞ ¼
R x¼y
x¼y qiðxÞdx: As in the previous case, this optimization
problem may also turn out to be non-concave for certain density functions f(  ). For
example, if f(  ) is uniform, the optimization problem is not concave. As in the previous
case, we apply optimal bunching of types.8 Before stating our next proposition, we deﬁne
zbðyÞ ¼ yþ ð1 bÞLðyÞ:
Proposition 4. Given any bA[0,1] and assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal mechanism is
MsirðyÞ ¼ hqsi ðyÞ;AsðyÞ; asðyÞ; tsðyÞi, where, for any y[ ½y; y;
1. qsi ðyÞ ¼
qf ðzbðyÞÞ 8 y [ ½y; ~yðbÞ
qf ðzbð~yðbÞÞÞ otherwise

2. AsðyÞ ¼ A
f ðzbðyÞÞ 8 y [ ½y; ~yðbÞ
Af ðzbð~yðbÞÞÞ otherwise

3. asðyÞ ¼ a












Finally, we have no pooling (that is, ~yðbÞ ¼ y) if b satisﬁes zbðyÞ)yþ
½ðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ2D=16ðr1ðbÞ þ 1Þ; and we have partial pooling otherwise.
The indirect mechanism under asymmetric information is similar to the indirect
mechanism, modulo the fact that the regulator uses the virtual marginal cost zb(y) for the
incumbent rather than its true cost y. As in Caillaud (1990), the regulator substitutes
the production of the incumbent by the production of the entrant, hence the rents
paid to the incumbent are lower while the expected price remains identical
ðEfðPðy;fÞÞ ¼ zbðyÞ for all y)~yðbÞÞ: Therefore, for each y)~yðbÞ, the consumer surplus
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is on an average identical to the directly regulated monopoly regime under asymmetric
information. Competition is welfare-enhancing because the contribution of the regulator
to the infrastructure cost is lower in comparison to a monopoly solution under
asymmetric information. As in the known cost case, the positive contribution of the
entrant to the infrastructure cost implies a reduction of the transfer. In addition, given
that the incumbent produces less when it faces the threat of entry, the information rent is
also lower; hence the regulator has another reason to reduce the transfer. However, in
our framework the incumbent always produces, whereas in Caillaud (1990) the
incumbent is shut down when its virtual marginal cost is larger than the expected cost
of the entrant. This is because the incumbent’s presence enhances competition on the
downstream market, which is not necessary in Caillaud’s framework owing to the
presence of a competitive fringe of entrants.
When concavity is not satisﬁed, i.e. for some f(y) and y>~yðbÞ, the optimal
mechanism has a bunching zone. Bunching appears when there is a lot of entry, i.e. for
the higher values of y. To overcome the existence problem and to preserve competition,
the regulator sets a minimal quantity for the higher types. In the bunching region
EfðPðy;fÞÞ ¼ zbð~yÞ<zbðyÞ for all y[ð~y; y: Consumer surplus is on an average higher
than under the direct regulation monopoly regime, and competition is also welfare-
improving, even if transfer may increase.
In this mechanism, entry occurs if f)KsðyÞ ¼ Kf ðzbðyÞÞ: We now consider the
question of efﬁcient entry and compare entry levels under complete and incomplete
information.
Proposition 5. Under MsirðyÞ ¼ hqsi ðyÞ;AsðyÞ; asðyÞ; tsðyÞi, the following can be said about
the entry limit Ks(y).
1. If ~yðbÞ ¼ y, then KsðyÞ ¼ y; KsðyÞ<y; Ks(y) is strictly increasing in y[ ½y; y and
Kf(y)oKs(y) for all y[ ½y; y:
2. If ~yðbÞ<y, then KsðyÞ ¼ y, Ksð~yðbÞÞ<y, Ks(y) is strictly increasing in y[ðy; ~yðbÞÞ,
KsðyÞ ¼ Ksð~yðbÞÞ for all y[ ½~yðbÞ; y and Kf(y)4Ks(y) for all y[ ½y; y:
What follows from Proposition 5 is that Kf(y)oKs(y) for all y[ðy; yðbÞÞ; that is, in
general, there is more entry underMsirðyÞ than underMfirðyÞ: This is because the regulator
allows entry by considering the gap between the incumbent’s virtual marginal cost and
the entrant’s true marginal cost, while under complete information the regulator allows
entry by considering the gap between the incumbent’s true (and not virtual) marginal cost
and the entrant’s true marginal cost. Since the virtual marginal cost of the incumbent is
larger than its true marginal cost, there is more entry under asymmetric information. The
regulator allows more entry under asymmetric information simply because production of
the incumbent is relatively more costly than that of the entrant.9 This result is in sharp
contrast with Dana and Spier, and Caillaud and Tirole (2004), where incomplete
information reduces competition. In Dana and Spier, where the market structure is
regulated, monopoly production is more likely under asymmetric information. More-
over, the monopoly right is not necessarily granted to the more efﬁcient ﬁrm. The high-
cost ﬁrm can operate in the market when the low-cost ﬁrm has a larger virtual marginal
cost than the high-cost one.
Under MsirðyÞ two types of inefﬁcient entry are possible: (A) not allowing a potential
entrant, more efﬁcient than the incumbent, to operate on the downstream market and (B)
allowing a potential entrant, less efﬁcient than the incumbent, to operate on the
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downstream market. The type A inefﬁciency follows from Proposition 5. Note that
KsðyÞ ¼ y and KsðyÞ<y ðKsð~yðbÞÞ<yÞ under a fully (partially) separating mechanism
guarantees that there are intervals in the domain of the continuously differentiable Ks(y)
function such that Ks(y)oy. However, a B type inefﬁciency entry does not follow from
Proposition 5 but depends on distribution of the marginal cost of the incumbent. It is
easy to verify that if, for example, f(  ) follows uniform distribution, that is if f ðyÞ ¼
gðfÞ ¼ 1=D for all y[ ½y; y and if b ¼ 0, then the second type of inefﬁciency is also
possible. With uniform distribution there will be pooling under unknown cost, and
complete separation under known cost, and in particular the cut-off points are ~yð0Þ ¼
ð121=224Þyþ ð103=224Þy for the unknown cost case and yð0Þ ¼ y for the known cost
case. Using Ksð~yð0ÞÞ ¼ ð11=14Þyþ ð3=14Þy; we get Ksð~yð0ÞÞ  ~yð0Þ ¼ ð55=224ÞD>0:
Hence, if the marginal cost of the incumbent follows uniform distribution, then
Ksð~yð0ÞÞ>~yð0Þ; which implies that there are stretches of the Ks(y) function where the
second type of inefﬁciency arises, i.e. non-empty intervals in ½y; y where Ks(y)4y. The
entry situation with b ¼ 0 and with uniform f and g functions is illustrated in Figure 2.
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we provide a framework for analysing the impact of a regulatory
mechanism on the market structure in the presence of incomplete information. In
particular, we analyse a model of regulation in a market where a ﬁrm owns an essential
facility and the market structure is endogenous. There are two players in the market: the
incumbent ﬁrm (that owns the essential facility) and a potential entrant. The regulator
uses four instruments to regulate this market in order to maximize social welfare. The
social welfare function in our problem is general, in the sense that it allows for different
welfare weights to producer’s surplus. The instruments are the quantity to be produced
by the incumbent, the amount of public funding to be transferred by the regulator to the
incumbent, and a two part tariff to be paid by the entrant to the incumbent if the entrant
FIGURE 2. The entry levels under complete and incomplete information for f ðyÞ ¼ gðyÞ ¼ 1=D and for
b ¼ 0.
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decides to enter the market. Depending on the weight b, we can have either a completely
separating solution or a partial separating solution. Our optimal indirect regulatory
mechanisms takes care of the conﬂict between efﬁcient market structure and
infrastructure ﬁnancing that results from incomplete information and the provision of
non-discriminatory access of the essential facility to the entrant.
The main conclusion of this paper is that granting non-discriminatory access of the
essential facility to a competitor is welfare-improving compared with the monopoly
outcome, though such non-discriminatory access leads to inefﬁcient entry.
With, a known marginal cost of the incumbent, we achieve a welfare improvement
with the optimal indirect regulation mechanism relative to the regulated monopoly
regime. This welfare improvement is mainly due to the contribution of the entrant to
infrastructure ﬁnancing. Competition leads to a larger consumer surplus only when there
is bunching of less efﬁcient incumbents (a pooling situation). In all the other cases the
expected price is the same as in the regulated monopoly regime, and competition allows
the regulator to reduce her transfer. As a result, we have a rise in social welfare. An entry
ban of more efﬁcient competitors aims to ﬁnance the infrastructure. By allowing only the
entry of a competitor with a sufﬁciently large cost advantage, the regulator can extract a
larger contribution towards the cost of the essential input.
With the marginal cost of the incumbent unknown, we also achieve welfare
improvement with the optimal indirect regulation mechanism in comparison with the
regulated monopoly regime. This welfare rise is not only because of the contribution of
the entrant to infrastructure ﬁnancing, but also because of the lower information rent
paid to the incumbent, which is achieved by substituting incumbent’s output with the
entrant’s output. Hence in this case we have more entry compared with our indirect
regulation mechanism where the marginal cost of the incumbent is known. Depending on
the distribution of the incumbent’s marginal cost, the other form of inefﬁciency arises, i.e.
that of a less efﬁcient competitor entering the market.
In a monopoly regulation problem, if the cost of the monopolist is unknown and the
regulator has limited funds, the optimal mechanism is a third-best one, since optimal
output with limited funds is lower than the second-best output (see Gautier and Mitra
2006). Allowing for endogenous market structure and indirect regulation can help in this
sort of a limited fund situation in two ways. First, with indirect regulation we have a
lower transfer of public funding (from the regulator to the incumbent) relative to both
second-best and third-best regulated monopoly situation. Second, owing to potential
competition in the downstream market, the expected output in the market is also higher
relative to the second-best and hence third-best monopoly output.
The two-part tariff plays an important and indirect role in regulating the entrant.
Recall that this two-part tariff is contingent on the type of the incumbent. The ﬁxed part
of the two-part tariff helps to deter entrants lacking adequate cost advantage relative to
the incumbent. Once the entrant is efﬁcient enough and decides to enter the market, we
have a Stackelberg leader–follower situation which generates output below the
competitive level. In order to reduce this output inefﬁciency, the entrant gets a per-
unit subsidy from the incumbent so that this output gap is reduced.
In the open-access environment with non-discriminatory access charges, the market
structure is necessarily inefﬁcient under optimal regulation. It may seem that one possible
way out of this problem would be to specify two production levels for the incumbent,
where one level applies if entry does not occur and the other level applies if entry does
occur. However, even then we cannot have efﬁcient market structure simply because it is
not possible to regulate the production of the entrant. Hence maintaining a positive
2008] REGULATION OF AN OPEN ACCESS ESSENTIAL FACILITY 673
r The London School of Economics and Political Science 2007
production level for the incumbent, even though the entrant is more efﬁcient, is a means
of disciplining the entrant. Moreover, it is also not optimal to ensure efﬁcient entry
simply because the regulator continues to face the same trade-off between restricting
entry and increasing the ﬁnancial contribution of the ﬁrms active on the market.
Therefore, it is an open question whether more sophisticated regulatory instruments such
as more general tariffs can solve the twin problem of inefﬁcient market structure and
inefﬁcient entry.
Following Caillaud (1990), we considered a scenario where the regulator speciﬁes the
regulatory environment before the competitor decides to enter the downstream market. It
is an open question as to what will happen if we reverse the sequence of moves, that is if
we consider a regulatory environment in which, the ﬁrst stage, the entrant announces its
quantity and, contingent on this announcement, in the second stage the regulator
speciﬁes (i) the quantity to be produced by the incumbent, (ii) access charges to be paid
by the entrant to the incumbent and (iii) the amount of public funding that the
incumbent will receive from the regulator. Clearly, that analysis will depend on the
regulator’s second-stage knowledge of the entrant’s expected proﬁt conditional on the
entrant’s ﬁrst-stage announced quantity. However, unless there is some interdependence
between the (announced) quantity of the entrant and its (unknown) marginal cost which
is known to the regulator, there will be inefﬁcient entry. Hence we feel that changing the
sequence of moves cannot achieve much when cost of the entrant is unknown. A
regulatory mechanism contingent on output of the entrant can be very effective if, instead
of changing the sequence of moves, we consider a model of repeated interaction where
the objective is to achieve ‘dynamic’ market efﬁciency. In such a scenario the regulatory
contract of the incumbent from the second period onwards will be contingent on the
entry decisions (and hence output decisions) of the entrant. This is clearly a very good
open question.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
Given the optimal entry decision of stage 2, in stage 1 the regulator maximizes EfðWðy;fÞÞ ¼R f¼y
f¼y Wðy;fÞgðfÞdf where Wðy;fÞ ¼ b2Q2ðy;fÞ þ bfpiðy;fÞ þ peðf; yÞg  tðyÞ: Using peðy;fÞ ¼
bq2eðfÞ  AðyÞ and Efðpiðy;fÞÞ ¼ 0 we get











bq2eðfÞ þ aðyÞqeðfÞ þ ð1 bÞAðyÞ
 	
gðfÞdf c:
Simpliﬁcation Ef(W(y, f)) we get




þ yðyÞ 3yðyÞ þ 2aðyÞ
2b
 
GðKðyÞÞ þ PbðyÞ  c
where yðyÞ ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbAðyÞp ,
PbðyÞ ¼ 1þ 2b
8b
 
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and IiðKðyÞÞ ¼
R f¼KðyÞ
f¼y ðKðyÞ  fÞigðfÞdf for iA{1,2}. Integrating by parts we get I1ðKðyÞÞ ¼R f¼KðyÞ
f¼y GðfÞdf and I2ðKðyÞÞ ¼ 2
R f¼KðyÞ
f¼y GðfÞdf where GðfÞ ¼
R x¼f
x¼y GðxÞdx: The ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to qi(y), a(y) and A(y) gives
(i) ½PðqiðyÞÞ  y  yðyÞ 3yðyÞ þ 2aðyÞ
2
 















þ ½3yðyÞ þ aðyÞGðKðyÞÞ
2

























From conditions (i) and (iin) it follows that expected market price equals the marginal cost of the
incumbent; that is
ðivÞ EfðPðQðy;fÞÞÞ ¼ y 8 y[ ½y; y:




GðKðyÞÞ ¼ ½yðyÞ þ aðyÞGðKðyÞÞ:
Finally, from (i) and (v), we get
ðviÞ PðqiðyÞÞ  y ¼ yðyÞ 3yðyÞ þ 2aðyÞ
2
 








Assuming uniform distribution of f, we get two possible solutions. One is
½1 qfi ðyÞ ¼
aHbðyÞ
b
; af ðyÞ ¼  5 2b
11 6b
 
ðHbðyÞ  yÞ and
Af ðyÞ ¼ 6 4b
11 6b










ð11 6bÞ2D2  2ð56 32bÞDðy yÞ
q :
Substituting r1(b) ¼ 6  4b, r2(b) ¼ 5  2b and SbðyÞ ¼ ðHbðyÞ  yÞ=ðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ we get qf(y),
af(y) and Af(y) of this Proposition provided Qðy; bÞ ¼ 1. The other possible solution is the one
where we have complete entry ban; that is, 8 y,
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½2 qfi ðyÞ ¼
a y
b
; af ðyÞ ¼ 3ðy yÞ and Af ðyÞ ¼ 4
b
ðy yÞ2:
Complete separation of solution [1] exists only if b is such that y[ ½y; y such that Db(y) is a
complex number (with non-zero imaginary part). It is quite easy to check that Db(y) satisﬁes this
restriction if and only if b[ ½0; b^, where b^ ¼ ð17 4 ﬃﬃﬃ3p Þ=18: Hence, for b[ ½0; b^, both solutions are
feasible. However the solution that leads to a higher welfare will be optimum. Hence to prove the
proposition it is necessary to show that solution [1] leads to a higher welfare than solution [2]. Let
W[i](y) denote the expected welfare with solution [i] for iA{1, 2} and DiðyÞ ¼ W½1ðyÞ W½2ðyÞ:
Using the two solutions, we get
ðA1Þ DiðyÞ ¼ ð1 bÞ









where gðbÞ ¼ ð77 86bþ 24b2Þ=ð77 16b 28b2Þ: In (A1), (a) 0og(b)41 for all bA[0,1], (b)
0< ½DbðyÞ=ð1 bÞ2ð56 34bÞ< 43 for all bA[0,1] and (c) DbðyÞ>DbðyÞ for all y[ðy; y: Using (a),
(b) and (c) in (A1), we get Di(y)40 for all y[ðy; y and DiðyÞ ¼ 0: Therefore we have established
that, except for y, solution [1] leads to a strictly higher welfare than solution [2].
To check the second-order condition with solution [1], we ﬁrst incorporate the optimal values
of af ðyÞ ¼ ½ð5 2bÞ=ð11 6bÞðPðqiðyÞÞ  yÞ and Af ðyÞ ¼ 1b ½ð6 4bÞ=ð11 6bÞ2ðPðqiðyÞÞ  yÞ2
as a function of the quantity qi(y) in W[1](y). This gives




2ð77 16b 28b2ÞðPðqiðyÞÞ  yÞ3
3bDð11 6bÞ3  c:




¼ b 1 8ð1 bÞ




Clearly, @2W½1ðyÞ=@qiðyÞ2<0 8 y[ ½y; y: Hence the optimal solution is [1]. From the value of Hb(y),
it is immediate that HbðyÞ ¼ y: Using some simple calculations, we can show that Hb(y)4y for all
y[ðy; y:BydifferentiatingHb(y) twicewith respect toy,weget thatHb(y) is increasingand strictly convex
in y[ðy; yÞ: Moreover, with solution [1] there is entry possibility and the entry limit is KðyÞ ¼ yþ










 c yqfi ðyÞ þ tf ðyÞ ¼ 0;
wheremf ðy;fÞ ¼ PðQf ðy;fÞÞqfi ðyÞ þ af ðyÞqeðy;fÞ þ Af ðyÞ:At theoptimum, the expectedmarketprice
equals the type of the incumbent. Therefore,









Substituting (A5) in (A4) and simplifying, we get
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for all y[ðy; y, which implies that tf(y)oc for all y[ðy; y: Using HbðyÞ ¼ y we get tf ðyÞ ¼ c: Thus,
we have established the solution for b[ ½0; b^:
For b[ ½b^; 1 we have a concavity problem. To solve this non-existence problem with pointwise
optimization, we incorporate an optimum bunching procedure. It is clear that the optimal cut-off
point is yðbÞ, where yðbÞ has the property that, for all y[ ½yðbÞ; y, Qðy; bÞ ¼ 0. Therefore, yðbÞ is the
point from which we have an existence problem with pointwise maximization. Thus, the optimal
solution is identical to the pointwise optimization problem in the well deﬁned zone and is a pooling
one for higher types. Finally, we verify that Di(y)X 0 for all y. It is obvious that DiðyÞ*0 8
y[ ½y; yðbÞ: For y[ðyðbÞ; y we get
ðA7Þ DiðyÞ ¼ DiðyðbÞÞ þ y yðbÞ
2b
 
HbðyðbÞÞ þ yðbÞ  2y
 
:
Using HbðyðbÞÞ ¼ yþ ½ð11 6bÞ2D=ð56 32bÞ, yðbÞ ¼ yþ ½ð11 6bÞ2D=2ð56 32bÞ and
HbðyðbÞÞ þ yðbÞ  2y*HbðyðbÞÞ þ yðbÞ  2y, we see that the right-hand side of (10) is not
smaller thanMðbÞ ¼ DiðyðbÞÞ þ ½ðy yðbÞÞD=4bð56 32bÞ½3ð11 6bÞ2  4ð56 32bÞ: The num-
ber M(b)40 for all b[ ½b^; 1: Hence the welfare under the partial bunching case dominates the
monopoly outcome.
To capture the monopoly price under both the no-pooling and partial-pooling cases, we deﬁne
HbðyÞ ¼ yþ ½ð11 6bÞ=ð56 32bÞ½DbðyÞ  Qðy; bÞDbðyÞ where Qðy; bÞ[f0; 1g takes care of the
non-concavity problem that can arise for b> ð17 4 ﬃﬃﬃ3p Þ=18: Note that if Qðy; bÞ ¼ 1 then HbðyÞ ¼
HbðyÞ and if Qðy; bÞ ¼ 0 then HbðyÞ ¼ yþ ½ð11 6bÞ=ð56 32bÞDbðyÞ: Finally, we show that (a)
if Qðy; bÞ ¼ 1 then HbðyÞ ¼ HbðyÞ and Hb(y) is increasing and strictly convex, and (b) given any
b> b^, HbðyÞ is horizontal to the y plane for all y[ ½yðbÞ; y: From (a) and (b) it follows that, for any
given bA[0,1], HbðyÞ is non-decreasing and convex. &
Proof of Proposition 2
If b[ ½0; b^ then, Qðy; bÞ ¼ 1 and HbðyÞ ¼ HbðyÞ and MfirðyÞ is such that
Kf ðyÞ ¼ r2ðbÞ  1
r1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞ
 




Using Hb(y), we get






ðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ2D2  16ðr1ðbÞ þ 1ÞDðy yÞ
q
:
Here Kf ðyÞ ¼ y and
Kf ðyÞ ¼ yþ ð1 bÞ ðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ






since r1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞ ¼ 11 6b<14 8b ¼ 2ðr1ðbÞ þ 1Þ: To show that Kf(y)oy for all y[ðy; yÞ, we
consider y Kf ðyÞ:We apply proof by contradiction to show that y Kf ðyÞ>0: Finally, y<Kf ðyÞ
8 y[ðy; yÞ follows from Kf ðyÞ ¼ y and from @½Kf ðyÞ=@y>0 over the relevant range.
Now consider the case where b[ðb^; 1, that is where we have partial bunching with yðbÞ as the
cut-off point. As long as y[ ½y; yðbÞ, the earlier arguments apply. Therefore, Kf ðyÞ ¼ y and Kf ðyÞ<
y for all y[ðy; yðbÞ: Moreover, Kf ðyÞ ¼ Kf ðyðbÞÞ<y for all y[ðyðbÞ; y since Kf ðyðbÞÞ<yðbÞ:
Hence, the result follows for all bA[0,1]. &
Proof of Proposition 3
Entry is efﬁcient if the solution to problem [A], given by the ﬁrst-order conditions (i), (ii) and (iii),
satisﬁes KðyÞ ¼ PðqiðyÞÞ  aðyÞ  2yðyÞ ¼ y (see the proof of Proposition 1). Suppose that this is
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possible for some distribution of f. We can then substitute K(y) by y in the ﬁrst-order conditions, and
this would imply that P(qi(y)) y can be replaced by a þ 2y(y). Therefore, the ﬁrst-order conditions are:
















þ ½3yðyÞ þ aðyÞGðyÞ
2















Solving (i)(a) and (iii)(a) for a(y) and y(y), we have two possible solutions:
ðIÞ aðyÞ ¼ ð1þ 2bÞGðyÞ
2ðGðyÞ  2Þ and yðyÞ ¼ 0
ðIIÞ aðyÞ ¼ ðb 1ÞGðyÞð16 12GðyÞÞ þ 3gðyÞGðyÞð2bþ 1Þ
2gðyÞð3GðyÞ  2Þ and
yðyÞ ¼ ðb 1ÞGðyÞð2GðyÞ  4Þ  gðyÞGðyÞð2bþ 1Þ
gðyÞð3GðyÞ  2Þ :
From (I) we get PðqiðyÞÞ ¼ yþ ½ð1þ 2bÞGðyÞ=½2ðGðyÞ  2Þ: Note that this solution corresponds
to the efﬁcient component pricing rule (ECPR).10 Using this solution in (ii)(a), efﬁcient entry
implies that, 8 y[ ½y; y;
ðA8Þ GðyÞðGðyÞ  1þ 2bÞ
2bðGðyÞ  2Þ ¼ 0:
Observe that for y ¼ y, (A8) is satisﬁed, since GðyÞ ¼ 0: However, for all y[ðy; y, GðyÞ>0 and
hence for (A8) to hold, it is necessary that GðyÞ ¼ 1 2b, which is a constant (for any given
bA[0,1]) 8 y[ðy; y: This is impossible given g(f)40 for all f[ðy; y: Hence ECPR is not a solution
to problem [A].
For solution (II), we substitute the values of a(y) and y(y) in (ii)(a). After simpliﬁcations, we see
that efﬁcient entry implies, 8 y[ ½y; y;
ðA9Þ 4GðyÞ
2ðb 1ÞðGðyÞ  1Þ þ gðyÞGðyÞðGðyÞð1 4bÞ þ ð2b 1ÞÞ
2bgðyÞð3GðyÞ  2Þ ¼ 0:
Note ﬁrst that, for y ¼ y, (12) is satisﬁed since GðyÞ ¼ GðyÞ ¼ 0: Consider any y[ðy; y: If 9 y[ðy; y
such that GðyÞ ¼ 2
3
, then the solution does not exist, implying impossibility. If, however, GðyÞ 6¼ 2
3
for all y[ðy; y, there is a discontinuous jump in the G(  ) function in the interval ðy; y, which is not
possible since we have assumed that G(  ) is a continuous function and the mechanism is
continuous. Hence in both cases solution (II) is not possible and we have a contradiction. &
Proof of Proposition 4
The regulator’s objective is to select the regulatory mechanismMsir ¼ hqsi ðyÞ;AsðyÞ; asðyÞ; tsðyÞi that
maximizes
R y¼y
y¼y EfðWðy;fÞÞf ðyÞdy where Wðy;fÞ ¼ b2Q2ðy;fÞ þ bfpiðy;fÞ þ peðf; yÞg  tðyÞ
and EfðWðy;fÞÞ ¼
R f¼y
f¼y Wðy;fÞgðfÞdf: The constraints faced by the regulator are (a)
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PiðyÞ*Piðy; y0Þ, 8 ðy; y0Þ[ ½y; y2 and (b) PiðyÞ*0, 8 y[ ½y; y: Using peðy;fÞ ¼ bq2eðfÞ  AðyÞ in
the surplus term we get











bq2eðfÞ þ aðyÞqeðfÞ þ ð1 bÞAðyÞ
 	
gðfÞdf
ð1 bÞPiðyÞ  c:
After simpliﬁcation, we get
























Given assumptions (1) and (2), constraints (a) and (b) are equivalent to (c) PiðyÞ ¼
R x¼y
x¼y qiðxÞdx:
Thus, the regulator’s problem is to select ðqsi ðyÞ;AsðyÞ; asðyÞÞ to maximize
R y¼y
y¼y EfðWðy;fÞÞf ðyÞdy
subject to constraint (c). Incorporating condition ½A and (c) in the maximization exercise, we
reduce the optimization problem to the following. Select ðqsi ðyÞ;AsðyÞ; asðyÞÞ to maximizeR y¼y
y¼y EfðWsðy;fÞÞf ðyÞdy, where








þ PbðyÞ  c:
The optimization can now be done pointwise; that is, the regulator’s problem now is to select
ðqsi ðyÞ;AsðyÞ; asðyÞÞ that maximizes EfðWsðy;fÞÞ for each y. This problem is similar to that of the
maximization problem in the proof of Proposition 1, where the regulator’s problem was to select
ðqfi ðyÞ;Af ðyÞ; asðyÞÞ to maximize EfðWðy;fÞÞ given by ~½A. The only difference between the two is
that, while in the former we had a term yqiðyÞ, in the latter this term is replaced by zbðyÞqiðyÞ:
Thus, as long as we do not have any non-concavity problems, following steps similar to those in
Proposition 1, we get the optimal quantity of the incumbent and the optimal access charges as
qsi ðyÞ ¼ qfi ðzbðyÞÞ, AsðyÞ ¼ Af ðzbðyÞÞ and asðyÞ ¼ af ðzbðyÞÞ for each y[ ½y; y: It is important to note
that, as in the known cost case, the entry ban solution under asymmetric information, i.e.
ðqiðyÞ ¼ ½a zbðyÞ=b;AðyÞ ¼ 4bðzbðyÞ  yÞ2; aðyÞ ¼ 3ðzbðyÞ  yÞÞ, is pointwise suboptimal, since
for each type y it yields a welfare not higher than the optimal solution. Substituting
ðqsi ðyÞ;AsðyÞ; asðyÞÞ in (3) and then setting PiðyÞ ¼
R x¼y






If the distribution f(y) is such that zðyÞ)yþ ð11 6bÞ2D=2ð56 32bÞ, thenHb(z(y)) is deﬁned
for all y[ ½y; y and the solution given above is valid. If, however, zbðyÞ>yþ ð11 6bÞ2D=2ð56 32bÞ,
we have an existence problem. This means that Hb(z(y)) is not deﬁned when zb(y) is above yþ
ð11 6bÞ2D=2ð56 32bÞ: Given that zb(y) is increasing in y, there is an existence problem for all
y[ ½~yðbÞ; y where ~yðbÞ ¼ z1b ½yþ ð11 6bÞ2D=2ð56 32bÞ: The existence problem comes from the
non-concavity of the EfðWsðy;fÞÞ function for y such that zbðyÞ>yþ ð11 6bÞ2D=2ð56 32bÞ:






2ð77 16b 28b2ÞðPðqiðyÞÞ  yÞ3
3bDð11 6bÞ3  c:
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¼ b 1 8ð1 bÞ
2ð77 16b 28b2Þ½DbðyÞ DbðyÞ
ð11 6bÞ3ð56 32bÞD
" #( )
The second derivative in condition (13) is negative only if zbðyÞ<yþ ð11 6bÞ2D=2ð56 32bÞ and
is not deﬁned otherwise. Hence if the distribution f(y) is such that (13) is not deﬁned, the above
solution is not valid for all y[ ½~yðbÞ; y:
To solve this non-existence problem with pointwise optimization, we incorporate the optimum
bunching procedure. For that we need to apply optimal control theory. We break the regulator’s
problem into two sub-problems. We deﬁne an interval ½y; ~yðbÞÞ, where we have full separability of
types, and the interval ½~yðbÞ; y, where we have pooling of types and ~yðbÞ is an as-yet undetermined,
cut-off point. The incentive compatibility problem in terms of the ﬁrst derivative (i.e.
@PiðyÞ=@y ¼ qiðyÞ) acts as the equation of motion in the two sub-problems, and the condition
PiðyÞ ¼ 0 (obtained from participation constraint) is the transversality condition. We solve for the
two sub-problems and ﬁnally select the optimal cut-off point ~yðbÞ: This cut-off point turns out to
be a point where we had existence problem with pointwise maximization. Thus, the optimal
solution is identical to the pointwise optimization problem in the well deﬁned zone and is a pooling
one for higher types. Finally, as in Proposition 1, it is quite easy to verify that this solution
dominates the entry ban solution. &
Proof of Proposition 5
If ~yðbÞ ¼ y, then the entry limit is
KsðyÞ ¼ Kf ðzbðyÞÞ ¼ r2ðbÞ  1
r1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞ
 




Thus, KsðyÞ ¼ Kf ðzbðyÞÞ ¼ Kf ðyÞ ¼ y since zbðyÞ ¼ y: Here
KsðyÞ
¼ yþ
ð1 bÞ ðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞD
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ




The last inequality follows because (a) given ~yðbÞ ¼ y, the term inside the square root is non-
negative and
ðbÞð1 bÞðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ




KsðyÞ ¼ Kf ðzbðyÞÞ
and
Kf ðzbðyÞÞ
and zb(y) are increasing in zb(y) and y respectively, it follows that K
s(y) is increasing in y[ ½y; y:
Note that the rate of increase in Ks(y) is ambiguous. Finally, given zb(y)4y for all y[ðy; y, we get
KsðyÞ  Kf ðyÞ ¼ 4ð1 bÞðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞðHbðzbðyÞÞ HbðyÞÞ>0 for all y[ ½y; y:
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If ~yðbÞ<y, then as in the previous case KsðyÞ ¼ y: At point ~yðbÞ,
Hbðzbð~yðbÞÞÞ ¼ yþ ðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ
2
8ðr1ðbÞ þ 1Þ D:
So
Ksð~yðbÞÞ ¼ yþ ð1 bÞðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ
2ðr1ðbÞ þ 1Þ D<y:
Moreover,
8 y[ðy; ~yðbÞÞ; KsðyÞ ¼ Kf ðzbðyÞÞ and Kf ðzbðyÞÞ
and zb(y) are increasing in zb(y) and y respectively. Therefore, K
s(y) is increasing in y[ðy; ~yðbÞÞ. To
prove the ﬁnal step, observe ﬁrst that ~yðbÞ<y) ~yðbÞ<yðbÞ)y since zb(y)4y for all y[ðy; y.
Also observe that
Hbðzbð~yðbÞÞÞ ¼ HbðyðbÞÞ ¼ yþ ðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ
2
8ðr1ðbÞ þ 1Þ D:
Using these two observations we get
ðaÞ KsðyÞ  Kf ðyÞ ¼ 4ð1 bÞðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ f HbðzbðyÞÞ HbðyÞg >0 for all y[ðy;
~yðbÞ;
ðbÞ KsðyÞ  Kf ðyÞ ¼ 4ð1 bÞðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ f Hbðzbð
~yðbÞÞÞ HbðyÞg >0 for all y[ð~yðbÞ; yðbÞÞ
ðcÞ KsðyÞ  Kf ðyÞ ¼ 4ð1 bÞðr1ðbÞ þ r2ðbÞÞ f Hbðzbð
~yðbÞÞÞ HbðyðbÞÞg ¼ 0 for all y[ ½yðbÞ; y:
From (a), (b) and (c), it follows that Kf(y)4Ks(y) for all y[ðy; y: &
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NOTES
1. This monopoly bottleneck does not exist if, owing to technical changes, the entrant(s) can bypass the
infrastructure of the monopolist. For example, it is now possible to provide telecommunication services
with wireless or cable TV networks, and these companies can compete with wire line networks on the
telecommunication services market. However, when this sort of bypass is not possible we have the
monopoly bottleneck problem.
2. The European Commission speciﬁes that access fees and access conditions to the bottleneck input
should be designed on a non-discriminatory basis. For example, in the preamble to the rail directive
2002/14/EC, it is required that: ‘To ensure transparency and non-discriminatory access to rail
infrastructure for all railway undertakings, all the necessary information required to use the access
rights are to be published in a network statement’, and ‘The charging and capacity allocation schemes
should permit equal and non-discriminatory access for all undertakings.’ Non-discriminatory access to
the railway tracks has been advocated by a large number of competition authorities, at least for freight
operators. For passenger services, access is limited to moderate competition (in the UK for example)
(see Campos and Cantos 1999). Similarly, in telecommunications, non-discriminatory access of wire
lines to competitors is recommended.
3. Here Rþ represents the non-negative orthant of the real line.
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4. In our model, if the regulator applies the ECPR, then entry is efﬁcient but not the market structure. See
the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
5. In a standard regulation model with an exogenously given market structure and with linear demand, the
surplus is a quadratic function of qi. In this model, the entry depends on the regulated mechanism and
the expected surplus is cubic in qi. Hence the concavity of the problem must be checked.
6. It is worth noting that if the downstream market were more competitive, i.e. if there were a larger
number of potential entrants, the entrants would have had less market power and hence the regulator
would have subsidized them less. Being distortionary, the per-unit access charge is used only to cancel
(partially) the entrant’s market power. Conversely, the non-distortionary ﬁxed fee is used by the
regulator partially to transfer the proﬁt of the unregulated competitor to the incumbent. This is because
the incumbent owns the essential facility that needs ﬁnancing. Again, if we had a single tariff (a Ramsey
price with A(y) ¼ 0), instead of a two-part tariff, the per-unit fee would be positive. In this case, the
access prices is used (i) to regulate entry, (ii) to raise money from the entrant and (iii) to inﬂuence the
entrant’s supply decisions.
7. If transfers are not possible (or are limited), the regulator should raise a larger contribution to the
infrastructure ﬁnancing from the ﬁrms. Since competition destroys proﬁt, to increase the ﬁrms’
contributions the regulator will deter more entry and increases the incumbent’s price. Similarly, if there
is a positive shadow cost of public funds, the regulator will restrict more entry to increase the ﬁrms’
share in the infrastructure ﬁnancing.
8. Caillaud (1990) demonstrates that, when a competitive fringe can compete with a regulated monopolist,
in his case without using the monopolist’s essential facility, the problem may not satisfy concavity, even
if the virtual type function is increasing in type.
9. McAfee and McMillan (1987) have a similar result in the context of auctions.
10. The ECPR is a per-unit access charge that guarantees efﬁcient entry on the downstream market. This
access price is equal to the incumbent’s opportunity cost, i.e., in our notation, aðyÞ ¼ PðqiðyÞÞ  y. See
Armstrong (2001).
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